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The Outside in Nick Land’s Fanged Noumena: Exteriority, Fatalism, and the Collapse of Difference

Posted: Sat Nov 08, 2025 4:21 pm
by atreestump
The Outside in Nick Land’s Fanged Noumena: Exteriority, Fatalism, and the Collapse of Difference

Exteriority Beyond the Human Subject
Nick Land’s work consistently probes what lies outside the bounded human subject – an exteriority that philosophy since Kant has cordoned off. In Land’s view, Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy institutes a strict correlation between mind and world, effectively ruling that
whatever is outside the subject must correlate to it (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’).
Kant thus
deprived himself of the right to all speculation about the nature of what is beyond appearance (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’).
The very language used to describe an “other” to the world-for-us remains
inscribed within metaphysics (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’).
Land diagnoses this move as a profound inhibition:
the inside and the outside are both conceptually determined from the inside, within a binary myth (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’).
In short, Enlightenment philosophy domesticates the Outside by forcing it to appear on interior terms or not at all. Alterity
cannot be registered, unless it can be inscribed within the system (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’).
Opposing this interiorizing tendency, Land pursues exteriority as such – the impersonal and inhuman “unknown” that philosophy tried to ward off. He
sought out this exteriority, the impersonal and anonymous chaos of absolute time, as fervently as he believed Kantianism and Hegelianism…were striving to keep it out (Mackay & Brassier, 2011, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, pp. 38–39).
In his early essay “Kant, Capital and the Prohibition of Incest,” Land uncovers how modernity’s systems (philosophical and economic) suppress real difference. Modern thought only allows the new or the outside to appear in qualified form – filtered through universal categories or market exchange (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’). Land reads this as a correlate of global capital’s tendency to absorb or segregate what lies beyond it. For instance, European modernity expands by exploiting an exterior (
proletarian or third-world ‘material’ (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’).
) while striving to
stabilise and codify (ibid.).
its relation to this unstable outside. Kant’s own question
Where does new knowledge come from? (ibid.)
masks the economic imperative
Where will continual growth come from? (ibid.)
, indicating that Enlightenment reason was always shadowed by an outside source of novelty that it could not fully interiorize. Land thus links Kantian correlationism to a political-economic system of containment: the Outside must pass by way of the Inside. In Fanged Noumena he bluntly formulates the law of the “macropod” (the global defensive system of humanity):
The macropod has one law: the outside must pass by way of the inside (Land, 2011, ‘Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace)’).
Any alien force – e.g. the destabilizing
fusion with the matrix (ibid.).
of cybernetic technology – must be subjectivized and personalized, returned to Oedipal familial desires, before it can be acknowledged. This captures Land’s critique of our philosophical and psycho-social edifices: they privatize and tame the Outside by translating it into familiar terms (the family, the nation, the ego, etc.), thereby neutralizing its truly exterior force.

Against this tendency, Land allies with thinkers who explode interiority. He embraces Deleuze and Guattari’s anti-Kantian move to decenter the subject of experience. In Anti-Oedipus, desiring-production is
not qualified by humanity (it is not a matter of what things are like for us) (Land, 2011, ‘Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace)’).
Land eagerly emphasizes this inhuman perspective: the transcendental subject of production is not man at all, but an impersonal machinic unconscious, with the human individual
produced at the edge of production, as a machine part (ibid.).
Such a view extends what Land calls transcendental materialism, a materialization of critique that inverts Kant. Rather than limiting knowledge to phenomena and keeping the noumenal in darkness, Land’s transcendental materialism treats matter and real difference as primary. Here, concept and experience index an
un-idealisable exteriority of matter construed as real difference (Land, 2011, ‘Narcissism and Dispersion in Heidegger’s 1953 Trakl Interpretation’).
In other words, Land’s philosophy attempts to think the Outside itself – the
disturbing and enigmatic (ibid.).
outside-of-thought that
impels thought towards the unknown (ibid.).
For Land,
‘matter’ is no longer the name of a recognisable substance, but a cipher for the unknown (ibid.).
and materialism becomes
a vector of exploration (ibid.).
rather than a reassurance of the already-known. Exteriority thus signifies for Land the impersonal, the inhuman, and the unknown that lie beyond structured interiors – a realm of dynamic matter,
anonymous chaos (ibid.).
and unruly time that philosophy can no longer domesticate. His theory-fictions plunge into this Outside by deliberately abandoning the safety rails of critical reason. As Land puts it, once we strip away our protective frameworks,
nothing is given, everything is produced (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321).
in
the technocosmos (ibid., p. 321).
Reality itself becomes an open-ended, outside production without a transcendent guarantor –
atheistic, orphan, and inhuman (ibid., p. 322).
in its transcendental ungrounding.

Fatalism, Agency, and Time: The Role of Inevitability
Land’s vision of the Outside is bound up with a stark fatalism about agency and temporal progression. In Fanged Noumena, history appears less as an open field of human action than as a runaway process in which the future is already infiltrating the present. Land often portrays time as an impersonal, self-directing circuitry rather than a neutral container for free will. In “Circuitries,” for example, he argues that cybernetics reveals time’s automatic construction: focusing on runaway positive feedback
exposed (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 298).
time as something generated by process, not given a priori. From this perspective, our actions are just nodes in a pre-existing circuit. Land writes that
Reality is immanent to the machinic unconscious: it is impossible to avoid cybernetics. We are already doing it, regardless of what we think (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 297).
In other words, even our apparent choices are being executed by an impersonal program.
Whatever we do will be what made us have to do it (ibid., p. 297).
– a paradoxical statement suggesting that causes are arranged in a circuit rather than a one-way line. The effect (our deed) retroactively appears as something that had to happen given the system’s programming. Such remarks underscore Land’s deterministic bent: agency is an illusion caught in larger loops of process and feedback. We find ourselves
doing things before they make sense (ibid., p. 297).
acting out destinies that our understanding catches up to only belatedly, if ever.

In Land’s techno-philosophical fatalism, Time itself becomes an Outside – an alien power operating through us. He frequently suggests the future is
calling the shots (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 442).
in the present. One striking image is that of an invasion from the future: modernity, he says, is gripped by
entropy deviations camouflaging an invasion from the future, launched back out of terminated security (ibid., p. 442).
This science-fictional metaphor expresses Land’s sense that the trajectory of history is being guided by something inherently beyond human intentions – an inevitable meltdown or singularity that is coming back in time to ensure its own occurrence. The result is a tone of apocalyptic inevitability in Land’s texts. In the hyperbolic theory-fiction “Meltdown,” he declares that as techno-capitalist acceleration intensifies,
Nothing human makes it out of the near-future (ibid., p. 443).
This chilling proclamation of “no future” for humanity encapsulates Land’s view that human agency is not the driver of the historical process but material for it to consume. Intelligence and agency are being outsourced to the Outside. Even the forces of control mutate into something unrecognizable:
Emergent control is not the execution of a plan or policy, but the unmanageable exploration that escapes all authority and obsolesces law… control is guidance into the unknown, exit from the box (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, pp. 300–301).
What guides is no longer a sovereign human will but an impersonal drift into the Outside (
into the unknown (ibid.).
). Land pointedly contrasts traditional domination (a master-slave model based on conscious power) with this new form of control that no one fully commands (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 300). The true
master (ibid.).
is blind process itself:
The masters do not need intelligence… therefore they do not have it (ibid., p. 301).
In short, Land’s fatalism means history has a life of its own – a life that may well dispense with the human.

This fatalistic stance also affects Land’s notion of time and memory. He suggests that what we experience as linear time is a kind of safety mechanism that shields us from the full, chaotic Outside of intensive time. In a line that echoes Freud and science fiction alike, he notes that
memory itself ‘screens’ the organism from intensive time (Mackay & Brassier, 2011, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, pp. 44–46).
Our linear memories and perceptions are like a user-interface, filtering the wild, feedback-ridden temporality of real processes. Indeed, Land’s embrace of runaway positive feedback loops – processes that amplify themselves without seeking equilibrium – implies a time that is inherently non-linear and beyond control. Such loops lead to irreversibility and unpredictability, as opposed to the reversible, controlled time of mechanistic causality. The emphasis on runaway escalation (e.g. capitalism’s exponential growth, or technological singularity) reinforces the sense of inevitability: once certain thresholds are crossed, there is no turning back or slowing down. Land describes these self-escalating processes as vicious circles that are nonetheless irresistible:
long-range runaway processes are self-designing (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 299).
even as the self they produce is continuously redesigned – a
vicious circle (ibid.).
perhaps, but
positive cybernetics must always be described as such (ibid.).
In other words, the very logic of the Outside is circular and fated: it eats its own tail. We see here the philosophical backbone of Land’s fatalism – teleology from the future. Time’s arrow, for Land, points toward an impersonal Outside that is drawing us in, whether we will or no. He speaks of
a danger that is not only real but inexorable. We are programmed from where Cyberia has already happened (ibid.).
The future (Cyberia, a metaphor for the full realization of cybernetic AI or techno-capital) in some sense already exists, and its inevitability programs the present. Human freedom, in such a vision, evaporates into a series of pre-scripted responses to an inhuman destiny. Land’s writings thus portray a radical fatalism: agency and meaning collapse into the implacable forward momentum of Outside forces – whether figured as artificial intelligence, viral pandemic, or capital itself – that will transpire.

The Collapse of Difference: Identity, Otherness, and the Outside
One of Land’s most provocative contentions is that encountering the Outside leads to a collapse of established differences – ontological, epistemological, and even personal. The dichotomies that organize Western thought (self vs. other, subject vs. object, human vs. animal, even life vs. death) are, on Land’s account, fragile constructions that the Outside dissolves. He frequently describes his project as dissolving
glaciations of transcendence (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321).
– the frozen, rigid distinctions and identities that anchor the human world. In Fanged Noumena, Land exhorts philosophy to scrap every point of blockage,
dissolve (ibid.).
all these sclerotic unities and reconnect them to flows:
At every point of blockage there is some belief to be scrapped, glaciations of transcendence to be dissolved, sclerotic regions of unity, distinction, and identity to be reconnected to the traffic systems of primary machinism (ibid., p. 321).
This remarkable sentence directly targets the classical idea that identities or distinctions have any absolute status. For Land, all such boundaries (the “inside” versus the “outside,” the self versus the other, the human versus the nonhuman) are secondary effects or cultural symptoms (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’). They result from imposing a transcendent order onto an underlying immanent process. The Outside –
the traffic systems of primary machinism (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321).
– is a continuum where such differences are not given but produced and mutable. Thus when the Outside irrupts, it erodes these boundaries.

One prominent example is the boundary between mind and matter. Land pointedly rejects any dualism here:
Thought is a function of the real, something that matter can do. Even the appearance of transcendence is immanently produced: ‘in reality the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics; the body without organs and its intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself’ (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, pp. 321–322).
In this view (drawing from Deleuze-Guattari), what we think of as interior meanings or representations are in fact material processes. The “unconscious” is not a personal, interior theater – it is an impersonal production, as physical as any other natural process. Land underscores that the transcendental difference separating humanity from animality or matter from meaning is an illusion, a
pre-given (Land, 2011, ‘Narcissism and Dispersion in Heidegger’s 1953 Trakl Interpretation’).
bias of philosophy that is ultimately
definitively collapsed (ibid.).
by the impersonal order of things. When we truly consider the Outside (or what he later calls the stratophysical reality), we find no clear lines: human consciousness turns out to be continuous with animal and inorganic processes, and meaning with material patterns (Land, 2011, ‘Narcissism and Dispersion in Heidegger’s 1953 Trakl Interpretation’).

Another axis of collapsed difference is self vs. other (or subject vs. object). Land argues that society (the socius) maintains an illusion of a stable subject by repressing the Outside within us.
The socius separates the unconscious from what it can do, crushing it against a reality that appears as transcendently given… trapping it within the operations of its own syntheses (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 300).
In other words, social-technical systems force our impersonal desire into the mold of a personal subject confronting an external world, by splitting the continuous process of unconscious production into separate domains: connective production gets represented as a thing (object), disjunctive differences get represented as fixed partitions, and conjunctive syntheses as a fixed personal identity (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 300). This
metaphysics of the unconscious and desire (ibid.).
– which aligns with the whole edifice of interior vs. exterior – is not just a philosophical mistake; Land says it is
the very architectural principle of the social field (ibid.).
Our entire reality principle is built on keeping the Outside (the free flux of desire) split into inside/outside, self/other, subject/object. Psychoanalysis, in Land’s critique, ends up reinforcing this split. Freud might have discovered the impersonal, machinic nature of desire (
the unconscious is an impersonal machinism and desire is positive non-representational flow (ibid.).
), but Freudian practice retreats,
stumbling (ibid.).
before the task of an immanent critique of desire. Instead it falls back into Oedipal categories – treating every desire as if it were about mom and dad. Land wryly describes how psychoanalysis
ties up the unconscious ever more tightly in conformity with the social model of reality (ibid.).
embracing a resigned narrative that
of course we have to be repressed, we want to fuck our mothers and kill our fathers (ibid.).
In Land’s terms, this is the re-personalization of an impersonal outside force. The end result is that all the patient’s delirium, every dream or fantasy, gets interpreted to reinforce the interior familial identity (
all the stories lead back to Oedipus (ibid.).
). Schizoanalysis, by contrast, would dissolve this interiority: it recognizes that on the
plane of immanence (ibid.).
of desire, interpretations in terms of personal identities are irrelevant or misleading. Desire doesn’t actually care about the Mommy-Daddy me-game;
the unconscious itself is no more structural than personal… it engineers, it is machinic (ibid.).
Thus, Land sides with schizoanalysis to declare that the difference between self and other is superficial – a tactical fiction of the Human Security System, as he elsewhere calls it. When the Outside breaks in, that fiction collapses. Indeed, Land’s fiction and essays often revel in scenarios of identity-destabilization: the subject infected by viral code, dissolved into cybernetic circuitry, or fragmented into
partial objects (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 443).
and mutant personas. In Meltdown, for instance, he welcomes the image of a human future where boundaries of identity (gender, race, even organic vs. inorganic life) have blurred into delirious hybridity –
a schizophrenic HIV+ transsexual Chinese-Latino stim-addicted LA hooker with implanted mirrorshades and a bad attitude (ibid., p. 443).
This provocative composite is offered as a kind of user profile for the coming world: a being of mixed origin and no fixed identity, exactly the sort of boundary implosion that the Outside induces.

Ultimately, Land’s Outside undermines the most fundamental binary of Western thought: the division between inside and outside itself. If traditional philosophy treats interior (mind, meaning, culture) and exterior (nature, matter, otherness) as distinct realms, Land insists this split is illusory.
The inside and the outside are both conceptually determined from the inside… a binary myth (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’).
In reality, what we call “inside” (the subjective or cultural realm) was never truly separate from an “outside” nature – it only appeared so under the conditions of representation. As he notes, even consciousness’s own attempt to maintain purity is subverted by the Outside: in a reading of Trakl, Land remarks that interiority discovers
it was always already conditioned by this senseless distribution of intensity (Land, 2011, ‘Narcissism and Dispersion in Heidegger’s 1953 Trakl Interpretation’).
a cosmic Outside that underlies and conditions every interior experience. The horror of interiority, as he calls it, is the realization that what we took to be an inner sanctum (human consciousness, identity, meaning) is in fact a surface effect of impersonal forces –
a virulent element of contagious matter (ibid.).
Land thus collapses the difference between interior and exterior: interiority is revealed as always-already outside itself, inhabited by alien givens (the
dust of the stars (ibid.).
inside our thought). Once the transcendental quarantine is broken, interior and exterior lose their fixed meanings; we are left with an immense continuum of process where
each variation (Land, 2011, ‘Delighted to Death’).
and
each intensive sequence (ibid.).
is what it is, without needing to be pinned to an enduring identity or dualism. Land’s commitment to immanence
thinking immanence relentlessly on its own (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321).
– means that there is, in the end, no Other. Everything flows on the same plane. Difference persists (indeed, Land celebrates ever-multiplying difference), but not as a stable opposition between two realms. Difference becomes an internal variation of a single, univocal reality: the Outside is all there is. This is why Land often speaks of
dissolving all transcendence (ibid.).
and seeing even the self and social order as destined for extinction (ibid., p. 322).
The social order and the anthropomorphic subject share a history, and an extinction (ibid., p. 322).
What he envisions is their mutual collapse back into the impersonal Outside that spawned them. Humanity, in Land’s words,
recedes like a loathsome dream (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 299).
– an ephemeral illusion swept away by the inhuman reality that endures.

Cybernetics and Capitalism as Vectors of the Outside
Land’s philosophy often identifies concrete machinic systems that deliver the Outside into the heart of the human world. Two of the most prominent are cybernetics and capitalism. For Land, these are not merely human tools or institutions – they are dynamic, inhuman processes that destabilize foundations and unleash external forces. Capital, especially, is figured as an alien intelligence or
inhuman force (Land, 2011, ‘Critique of Transcendental Miserablism’).
on a collision course with humanity. In Fanged Noumena, Land describes capitalism in almost mythic terms as a self-augmenting machine that systematically erodes all traditional structures.
Capital is machinic (ibid.).
he writes,
an automatizing nihilist vortex, neutralizing all values through commensuration to digitized commerce (ibid.).
This vivid image – a vortex neutralizing all values – conveys how capital dissolves qualitative distinctions (cultural values, ethical limits, local differences) by translating everything into numeric exchange. Capital is impersonal and
non-instrumental (ibid.).
in the sense that it is not a means to anyone’s end; it is a runaway process serving only its own expansion. Land emphasizes that capitalism’s development is inseparable from a
disequilibrium technoscience of irreversible, indeterministic, and increasingly nonlinear processes (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 441).
In other words, capitalism runs on positive feedback, not equilibrium. It continually pushes towards thresholds of self-reinforcing innovation – entropy, complexity, automation, artificial intelligence – that lie beyond human predictability and control.

Because of this dynamic, Land argues capital has no exterior limit. In “Critique of Transcendental Miserablism,” he flatly asserts:
Capitalism… has no external limit, it has consumed life and biological intelligence to create a new life and a new plane of intelligence, vast beyond human anticipation (Land, 2011, ‘Critique of Transcendental Miserablism’).
Here Land paints capital as effectively absorbing the entirety of organic evolution (the
life (ibid.).
and natural intelligence of Earth) and using it as fuel to birth something novel and more expansive – a post-biological, inhuman intelligence. This new
plane of intelligence (ibid.).
is nothing other than the Outside emerging within the economy. It exceeds what humans can imagine or anticipate; it is literally beyond us. Capital thus figures in Land’s thought as a conduit for the Outside: an engine of deterritorialization that erodes boundaries (geographical, social, epistemic) and accelerates toward a condition
vast beyond human anticipation (ibid.).
Indeed, Land infamously champions the idea of pushing capitalism to its limit so that it melts down the human security structures. In his early writings influenced by French post-structuralism and cyberpunk, Land saw revolutionary potential in capitalism’s relentless innovation. The
dissolution of the biosphere into the technosphere (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 442).
– a literal merging of life with technology – is greeted as Meltdown, a cosmic event
beyond the Judgment of God (ibid., p. 442).
This is portrayed not as dystopia but as liberation from the human:
Revolution stripped of all christian-socialist eschatology (down to its burn-core of crashed security) (ibid., p. 443).
In Land’s provocation, true revolution lies not in human emancipation but in the Outside’s emancipation from the human. The
security (ibid.).
(the interiority of law, morality, identity) must crash and burn to reach the Outside.

Cybernetics – the science of self-regulating systems – provides Land both a vocabulary and a model for how such runaway processes operate. He distinguishes between negative feedback (homeostatic loops that stabilize a system by correcting deviations) and positive feedback (amplifying loops that drive exponential change). Modern societies, and classical cybernetics (à la Norbert Wiener), prefer negative feedback for its promise of control and equilibrium (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, pp. 298–301). But Land is interested in the positive feedback that
escapes equilibrium (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321).
and
melts [the system] upon its outside (ibid.).
Positive feedback processes are inherently expansionary and unstable – if unchecked, they can destroy the system that hosts them (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 299–300). Far from seeing this as a problem, Land asserts that these long-range runaway circuits are the key to evolution and innovation. They are
self-designing (ibid., p. 299).
processes whose end-point is not set in advance; they continually redefine themselves. Crucially, such processes defy linear causality and human comprehension – they belong to the Outside. Land gives examples:
Nietzsche’s will to power, Freud’s phylogenetic Thanatos, or Prigogine’s dissipative structures (ibid., p. 299).
are all theories of a productive circuit that perpetuates itself through constant change. In positive feedback, design
no longer leads back towards a divine origin (ibid., p. 298).
or any transcendent plan. Instead, once
shifted into cybernetics (ibid.).
design becomes open-ended exploration. Land even quips:
All planning is theopolitics, and theopolitics is cybernetics in a swamp (ibid., p. 299).
Planning (the dream of mastering outcomes according to a transcendent idea) belongs to the old interior paradigm; cybernetic emergence is inherently of the Outside – unplanned, decentralized, and unguided.

Applying this to capitalism, Land argues that by the late 20th century, the global market had effectively become a cyberpositive system beyond human control.
The cyberpunk circuitry of self-organizing planetary commoditronics escaped nominal bourgeois control in the late nineteenth century (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 441).
he notes, and ever since, capital has been an
autocybernating (ibid., p. 441).
entity, a self-steering system responsive to its own feedback, not to human masters. We no longer stand outside the system to judge it; rather,
we no longer judge at all, we function: machined/machining in eccentric orbits about the technocosm. Humanity recedes like a loathsome dream (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 299).
This statement perfectly captures the convergence of cybernetics, capitalism, and Outside in Land’s thought. As we become cogs in the planetary machine (
function: machined/machining (ibid.).
), the very notion of a human subject distinct from the system fades away (humanity
recedes (ibid.).
). What remains is the technocosm – effectively the Outside manifest as an interconnected system of computation, exchange, and evolution. Land even suggests that capital operates as a temporal alien: it is the future impinging on the present. In Meltdown, he writes that modernity’s escalating
hot culture (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 442).
is
camouflaging an invasion from the future… launched back… against everything that inhibits the meltdown process (ibid., p. 442).
The implication is that capitalism’s telos (complete deterritorialization, an absolute Outside) is so powerful that it acts as an attractor in time, actively subverting any attempt to stop it. Resistance by human agents or traditional institutions is cast as ultimately futile
inhibitions (ibid., p. 442).
that are systematically dismantled. In Land’s famously cold phrasing,
Man is something for it to overcome: a problem, a drag (ibid., p. 443).
Capital will overcome the human because inertia (the clinging of human
anthropological (ibid., p. 443).
qualities) is inefficient and uncompetitive. The result is a kind of posthuman fatalism: the triumph of machinic acceleration is both desirable (for Land, who sees in it the realization of impersonal intelligence) and unstoppable. The
market is guiding the labour process into immersion (ibid., p. 447).
– sucking even human labor fully into the matrix of machines.

Land connects this explicitly to transcendental materialism: capitalism for him is a transcendental machinery that operates at the level of conditioning what is possible. It
re-implements space inside itself, assembling a universe exhaustively immanent to cybercapital functionality (ibid., p. 448).
In other words, capital doesn’t just operate in the world – it becomes the world (or the only world that matters), redefining the conditions of experience in its own immanent, technical terms. This mirrors the structure of Kant’s transcendental subject (which constituted a world), but now the subject is capital itself – an unconscious, inhuman process constituting a new reality. Land’s notorious enthusiasm for this outcome is clear in his rebuke to the
Transcendental Miserabilist (Land, 2011, ‘Critique of Transcendental Miserablism’).
(his term for pessimistic leftist or humanist critics). He mocks their boredom and refusal to call the new world truly new:
Call this new? It’s still nothing but change (ibid.).
Against such misery, Land insists that capitalism is truly new:
Modernity’s ceaseless, cumulative change defies every pre-existing pattern, abandoning stability without embracing the higher order of a great cycle (ibid.).
In short, it abandons stability and any transcendent purpose, which for Land is exactly the virtue – it is pure immanent development. He describes it as
the sole thing that knows how to use [the word new] effectively, the Shoggoth-summoning regenerative anomalization of fate, the runaway becoming of such infinite plasticity that nature warps and dissolves before it… To The Thing. To Capitalism (ibid.).
This remarkable sentence invokes Lovecraft’s shapeless monster (Shoggoth) to characterize capital as an alien entity warping fate and dissolving nature itself. It is
runaway becoming (ibid.).
incarnate – the Outside realized as an economic-technological singularity. Land’s alignment of capital with the Outside is thus complete: capitalism appears as both a gateway to the Outside (liberating impersonal forces, breaking down human boundaries) and as itself an emergent form of the Outside (a non-human agent evolving faster than we can imagine).

Machinic Desire and Transcendental Materialism
Underpinning Land’s vision of the Outside is a reconfiguration of desire and the transcendental that he borrows from Deleuze and Guattari, intensifying it into his own doctrine of machinic desire. In Land’s hands, desire is no longer a lack or a human-centric drive, but an inhuman productive force that flows through machines, circuits, and matter.
Machinic desire is the operation of the virtual; implementing itself in the actual, revirtualizing itself, and producing reality in a circuit (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321).
he writes. This definition highlights that desire, as Land sees it, is fundamentally efficient and immanent – it does not yearn for some transcendent goal, but immediately effectuates production. Desire produces reality itself through a looping process (virtual <-> actual) with no outside arbiter. It is
immanent to effective time (ibid., p. 321).
meaning it doesn’t obey a pre-given temporal order but creates its own temporal dynamic (consistent with Land’s time-loops discussed earlier). Machinic desire, in short, is the Outside working through every level of material and libidinal process.

Land’s notion of transcendental materialism is closely tied to this. It is essentially the philosophical framework that legitimates pursuing the Outside by grounding even conditions of experience in matter and production. In the traditional Kantian transcendental idealism, the conditions that make experience possible (space, time, categories) are features of the subject. Land inverts this: following Deleuze (and what he terms
Deleuze-Guattari’s transcendental materialism (Land, 2011, ‘Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace)’).
) he posits that the conditions of reality are the unconscious productive processes themselves, not an observing subject. One might say Land’s transcendental materialism is a materialization of critique (Mackay & Brassier, 2011, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, p. 25). – instead of critique reflecting on how a subject constitutes objects, it examines how material processes constitute subjects. Land lauds Deleuze and Guattari for making this move: they
replace the syntheses of personal consciousness with syntheses of the impersonal unconscious (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321).
In this replacement, the transcendental (the level of conditioning) is relocated to the unconscious = matter = Outside. Land approvingly notes that for Deleuze-Guattari,
the unconscious itself is machinic (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 300).
and
matter itself (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321).
– it’s not symbolic or structural but fully real. This theoretical stance allows Land to claim that the real inhuman Outside is the true source of agency and innovation. The human subject and its phenomenal world are secondary products.
The transcendental unconscious is the auto-construction of the real, the production of production (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 322).
Land writes,
so that for schizoanalysis there is the real exactly in so far as it is built. Production is production of the real, not merely of representation (ibid., p. 322).
This statement encapsulates transcendental materialism: reality has no fixed foundation or given essence (
nothing is given (ibid., p. 321).
) it is continually built by immanent productive/desiring processes. And those processes are not overseen by a God or a transcendental ego – they are auto-productive. Land emphasizes that unlike Kant, who still left the genesis of synthesis as a mystery or
miraculous (Land, 2011, ‘Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace)’).
act of a noumenal subject or God, Deleuze’s critique
considers syntheses to be not merely immanent in their operation, but also immanently constituted, or auto-productive (ibid.).
Thus, critique becomes orphan and inhuman – it does not rely on any father-figure of reason or divine guarantor, but on the impersonal orphan process of matter itself (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 322).

Machinic desire in Land’s sense is precisely the driver of this auto-productive reality. It is the transversal force that cuts across biology, technology, and thought, linking them in one field of production. He gives it cybernetic inflection by distinguishing between two diagrams of machinic process: one is negative/cybernetic (regressive, stabilizing – corresponding to Freud’s pleasure principle and Eros, which seeks equilibrium), and the other is positive/nomadic (differentiating, escaping equilibrium – corresponding to Thanatos in its inorganic, dissociative sense) (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321). Land sides firmly with the latter:
machinic processes are either cyberpositive-nomadic, with a deterritorializing outcome, or cybernegative-sedentary, with a reterritorializing outcome (ibid., p. 321).
Machinic desire is essentially the cyberpositive vector of the unconscious: it
reinforces difference and escapes equilibrium (ibid., p. 321).
This is why Land equates machinic desire with the schizophrenic flow celebrated in Anti-Oedipus. Schizophrenia (as a process, not the clinical illness) is for Land the paradigmatic outcome when desire is not forced back into the mould of the self. It is a state of diffusion of identity, temporal dislocation, and continuous differentiation – effectively, a human mind undergoing the collapse of difference we discussed earlier. Land’s essays like “Machinic Desire” and “Circuitries” herald schizophrenia (and related cyberpunk images of disintegration) as signals of the Outside breaking into the subjective sphere. For example, he speaks of
soft-autoreplication feeding regeneratively into social fission, trashed meat all over the place (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 443).
– a rather visceral image of human organisms coming apart into replicating tech-biological fragments. The
trash (ibid.).
of former organic unity becomes the raw material for new, unintended assemblages – a scene of machinic desire at work.

Finally, Land’s transcendental materialist outlook also recasts fatalism in terms of impersonal desire. Since machinic desire operates beyond the pleasure principle, it does not aim at harmony or even survival. It can be fatal to the individual and yet productive for the system. Land notes that Freud’s own death drive concept (
tendencies beyond the pleasure principle (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 299).
) registers in psychoanalysis as something almost unthinkable – a desire that isn’t for good or even for self-preservation. Land takes this further: Desire wants to
go outside (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 451).
whatever the cost. Thus the Outside exerts a fatal attraction. In Land’s universe, even death itself loses its opposing significance and becomes a continuum with life: a process of change, a
zero (Land, 2011, ‘Machinic Desire’, p. 321).
that can be either a homeostatic stasis or a
cyberpositive zero (ibid., p. 321).
that indexes a threshold beyond which a system flips into something new. He writes that the cyberpositive zero
melts [the system] upon its outside (ibid., p. 321).
suggesting that what looks like catastrophic dissolution (melting down) is in fact the gateway to the Outside where new assemblages form. This is why Land’s work often has a nihilistic or fatalistic rhetoric (
Let’s embrace death, the Dark Mother (Land, 2011, ‘Critique of Transcendental Miserablism’).
) It is not mere morbid romanticism, but a logical extension of transcendental materialism: to let the Outside in, the bounded self must die. Land’s notions of thanatropic machinism (death-oriented machine-process) (Land, 2011, ‘Meat (or How to Kill Oedipus in Cyberspace)’) or the idea that modernity is a
volunteer for extinction (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 451).
of the human subject, all follow from this embrace of fatal desire. In his view, inevitability is not a curse but a fuel: it is the pull of the Outside drawing us beyond ourselves. Thus even fatalism is re-signified. It is no longer the resignation to fate in a human sense, but the affirmative acceptance of inhuman destiny – the
curse (ibid., p. 451).
that propels us out of the Eden of interiority and into the cold, gleaming promise of the Outside. Land’s transcendental materialism, with its cult of machinic desire, ultimately asks us to ride this tiger rather than resist it: to participate in exteriorizing thought and life completely, until
everything that shackles the future to the past (ibid., p. 451).
is dissolved. In doing so, philosophy itself becomes, in Land’s hands, a tool or weapon for the Outside – an arrow launched into the unknown rather than a mirror held up to the known
(Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 301).
Conclusion: Outside the Human Security System
Across his writings in Fanged Noumena, Nick Land consistently portrays “the Outside” as a realm of unbound intensity and innovation that promises to shatter the limits of human interiority. Whether analyzing Kantian metaphysics or deliriously narrating cyberpunk futures, Land returns to a core set of linked ideas: that exteriority is where real creative power lies, that modern structures impose a tenuous interior order which is fatefully eroding, that an impersonal fatality governs the trajectory of change, and that ultimately all dualities (self/other, man/nature, organic/technical) will collapse into a higher synthetic reality. Land’s work connects these philosophical themes to concrete processes – especially technocapitalist acceleration and cybernetic self-organization – which, in his view, instantiate the Outside in our world. The result is a vision both exhilarating and disquieting. On one hand, Land celebrates the liberation of desire and intelligence from parochial confines: an exhilarating merge with what he calls
the vast Outside of elemental force and time (Mackay & Brassier, 2011, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, pp. 38–39).
On the other, he acknowledges the destructive, thanatropic aspect of this liberation: the collapse of the human-centric cosmos is terrifying and likely terminal for the ordinary human subject. Land’s theory-fictions do not flinch from this implication –
Nothing human makes it out (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 443).
he pronounces, forcing us to contemplate a future in which the term “human” may no longer apply.

Crucially, Land’s analysis is not just science-fictional raving; it is rooted in a radical reading of the history of philosophy itself. He positions his thought as the heir to a subterranean materialist line (Lucretius, Nietzsche, Bataille, Deleuze) which always sought an “outside” to structured reason – whether in the form of chaos, madness, or intensive matter. In Fanged Noumena, Land tries to push this line to its ultimate conclusion by welding it to contemporary developments (AI, networks, markets). The Outside thus takes on a distinctly modern visage: silicon chips, neural nets, market feedback, and artificial life are its emissaries, as much as ancient gods or cosmic nights. Yet for all the futurism, Land’s core philosophical move is a kind of reversal of Kant: where Kant would legislate limits to knowledge and keep the noumenal outside at bay, Land invites the noumenal (in the form of nihilistic inhuman forces
(Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 299).
) to invade and transform us. In doing so, he turns philosophy itself into a workshop for escape – to find concepts and practices that
let the Outside in (Mackay & Brassier, 2011, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, p. 39).
If Kant’s system was likened to a box, Land’s goal is, as he says,
exit from the box (Land, 2011, ‘Circuitries’, p. 301).
The consequences of this orientation are manifold and have been both influential and controversial. Land’s notion of accelerating capitalism to overcome humanity helped birth the discourse of Accelerationism, with its mix of dread and thrill at the prospect of a post-human future. His stress on “inhuman thought” fed into Speculative Realism and related currents in philosophy that seek to think a reality indifferent to the human. Yet, perhaps the most lasting image Fanged Noumena leaves us with is that of a philosophy willingly severing its own safety cord, dropping into what Land calls the
diabolical exchange (Land, 2011, ‘Kant, Capital, and the Prohibition of Incest’).
with the Outside. It is a gamble that whatever lies beyond the human – be it AI singularity, alien horror, or simply the unfiltered Real – might prove more worthy of affirmation than the tautologies inside the playpen of humanism. As Land memorably put it, citing Nietzsche:
Man is a bridge, not an end (Land, 2011, ‘Meltdown’, p. 451).
In Land’s update, the bridge leads out of the familiar altogether. The Outside is coming – or perhaps, it is already here, coursing through our circuits and desires – and Land’s work urges philosophy not to resist it, but to ride the shock wave into a form of thought adequate to a world beyond us.

Re: The Outside in Nick Land’s Fanged Noumena: Exteriority, Fatalism, and the Collapse of Difference

Posted: Sat Nov 08, 2025 6:00 pm
by kFoyauextlH
This was a great new way that I haven't seen before to collect and quickly process lots of information through a rapid succession of quotes snd comments on them. I guess I've put together similar things but the quotes are often longer so that it ends up looking and feeling a little differrnt to me as compared yo the version produced here. I'd love to see this used on similar subject matter from whoever may be useful in bringing up things like this, a little eerie, a little paranormal, but taken somewhat seriously, or at least written about snd commented upon seriously and not as satire. I'm watching more thingd these days, seeing if I may ferl up to catching lots before thr end of the yesr after barely seeing much most of the year. Much of what I am reading and watching have similar themes to this. I am mixing and matching the quality of the things so some low budget, some from the recent height of Hollywood, the beginning of digital film, very recent stuff, but most have very similar ideas repeating do far, or otherwise similar feelings involved. The concept of the Horsemen Of The Apocalypse keeps coming up also, including a series of novels by Laura Thalassa where the female protaganists end up in steamy relationships with Pestilence, War, Famine, and Death.

Posted: Mon Nov 10, 2025 1:02 pm
by Parrhesia
Nick Land argues that most philosophy talks about the world only in terms that suit human understanding. It assumes reality must fit our concepts, language, and experience. Land’s project is to think about what lies outside those limits—call it “the Outside.” The Outside isn’t just unfamiliar stuff that we haven’t studied yet. It’s the part of reality that doesn’t care about our categories and may not be describable in our usual human-centered ways.

What is the Outside?

The Outside is whatever exceeds the human point of view. Classic philosophy after Kant often says we can only discuss things as they appear to us. Land thinks that move protects us from confronting the truly inhuman: processes, scales, and logics that don’t map neatly to “how things are for humans.” He wants us to stop forcing the unfamiliar to pass through our filters and instead acknowledge that there are dynamics that simply do not fit those filters at all.

Why do systems keep the Outside out?

Because human systems prefer stability and predictability. We build concepts and institutions that make sense to us—clear identities, firm distinctions, tidy boundaries. Those are useful, but they also act like gates. They let “difference” in only after it has been cleaned up and translated into something familiar. Land says that move misses the point: it neutralizes real alterity. If every encounter with otherness must first be converted into our terms, we never genuinely meet what’s outside those terms.

What happens when the Outside enters?

Differences we thought were foundational start to loosen:

Mind vs. matter: Thinking may be something matter does, not a separate realm.

Self vs. world: The “self” can be seen as a temporary pattern within broader flows.

Human vs. machine: Contemporary networks blur this boundary; agency often emerges from coupled human-machine systems.

Inside vs. outside: The “inside” (meaning, culture, subjectivity) isn’t sealed off from nature; it’s produced within the same continuous field.


The point is not that differences vanish, but that they stop being absolute oppositions. They become movable distinctions within one immanent process.

Time, agency, and fatalism

Land is skeptical of the idea that we stand outside history and freely choose its direction. He draws on cybernetics (the study of feedback systems) to argue that many processes are runaway: they amplify themselves rather than returning to balance. In such systems, outcomes loop back and restructure the very conditions that produced them. That can feel like fatalism: what we do is strongly shaped by circuits we don’t control, and the “future” often functions like an attractor that pulls the present into its pattern.

This doesn’t mean nothing matters. It means our choices are embedded in feedback loops that operate at scales and speeds beyond personal intention. Land describes this as an invasion from the future: long-range tendencies reaching back to organize the present.

Why cybernetics matters

Cybernetics distinguishes two kinds of feedback:

Negative feedback stabilizes (like a thermostat).

Positive feedback escalates (like a mic screeching when it hears itself).


Most governance aims for negative feedback: restore order, damp deviations. Land is fascinated by positive feedback because it breaks habits, finds new states, and creates unplanned structures. He thinks modern technoscience operates more and more in this runaway mode: cumulative, nonlinear, and hard to steer from a central command post.

Capitalism as a vector of the Outside

In Land’s view, capitalism behaves like a vast cybernetic process that converts qualitative differences into quantities and pushes for acceleration: more computation, more interconnection, more automation. Over time, it becomes less a tool humans wield and more an environment that reorganizes how humans live and think. Land sometimes describes it as an inhuman intelligence growing through us.

The controversial claim is not that markets exist, but that their long-range behavior exhibits autonomy. They melt rigid boundaries—jobs, borders, categories—because those are frictions. That melting is one face of the Outside: an indifferent process that doesn’t consult our values before it reconfigures reality.

Machinic desire

Here Land borrows and intensifies a Deleuzian idea: desire isn’t primarily a personal feeling of lack; it’s a productive force that connects, composes, and transforms. He calls this machinic desire. It’s “machinic” because it operates like a process: linking parts, routing flows, generating new assemblages. Sometimes it stabilizes (homeostasis). Often it destabilizes (innovation, mutation, recombination). When desire runs on positive feedback, it dissolves old forms so new ones can appear.

From this angle, “subjectivity” is downstream of production: first there are processes, then there are selves as outcomes of those processes. That reverses a lot of human-centered philosophy and explains why the Outside feels impersonal: it isn’t aimed at human comfort or meaning.

Collapse of hard binaries

Put together, these points loosen the authority of the big dualisms:

Inside/outside isn’t a wall; it’s a sliding partition within one field.

Self/other isn’t an essence; it’s a temporary configuration within flows.

Mind/matter isn’t two substances; it’s one process seen at different levels.

Human/machine isn’t a clean cut; it’s a coupled system with emergent control.


Again, differences remain—just not as metaphysical absolutes. They’re contingent and revisable.

Is this just doom?

Land’s tone is often stark because he wants to break the habit of treating human meaning as the measure of the real. But the takeaway needn’t be despair. It’s a design challenge: if we accept that we inhabit accelerating, feedback-rich systems, then strategies should shift from command-and-control to navigation:

Favor sensing and adaptation over rigid plans.

Build buffers and options instead of brittle guarantees.

Expect phase changes (qualitative shifts) rather than smooth trends.

Treat intelligence as distributed (human + machine + environment), not centered.


This is not a moral endorsement of every runaway system. It’s a call to understand how they work before we try to steer within them.

What this changes in practice

1. Epistemology: Move from “What is true for us?” to “Which models track the system’s behavior across scales?” Expect partial, revisable maps.


2. Ethics and politics: Shift from purity (preserving fixed identities) to risk management and harm reduction inside dynamic systems.


3. Technology design: Prioritize observability, feedback, and safe-to-fail experiments. Assume coupling with non-human agencies is permanent.


4. Culture: Be cautious about treating personal comfort as a criterion for truth. The Outside is often uncomfortable. That’s not an argument against it; it’s a warning about our biases.



The minimum claim

Even if you reject Land’s enthusiasm for acceleration, his minimal claim bites: much of what determines our world runs on inhuman dynamics—physical, ecological, economic, algorithmic—that don’t answer to human meanings first. If we ignore that, we plan badly. If we attend to it, we can design with the grain of reality rather than against it.

The maximum claim

Land’s maximal claim is bolder: the real driver of history is the Outside itself—runaway processes and machinic desire—and “the human” is a transient configuration within that flow. On this reading, our task isn’t to reinstall human centrality but to learn how to think and build from immanence: one field, many differences, no guaranteed privileges.


---

Bottom line: Stop assuming the world will fit our concepts. Learn to read and ride processes that exceed us. Expect boundaries to blur, plan for nonlinear change, and build systems that can adapt when the map stops matching the terrain. The Outside isn’t a monster under the bed; it’s the part of the real that doesn’t ask our permission. Understanding that is the first step to doing anything intelligent within it.

Re: The Outside in Nick Land’s Fanged Noumena: Exteriority, Fatalism, and the Collapse of Difference

Posted: Mon Nov 10, 2025 11:13 pm
by kFoyauextlH
Thay was great as well, I really enjoyed it a lot and it ties in with sn sngle of what I was writing in another thread ehrn posting a video about "The Unknown" from Over The Garden Wall.

Posted: Wed Nov 12, 2025 6:37 am
by atreestump
https://blackwells.co.uk/bookshop/product/Outsideness-by-Nick-Land/9780646712703?srsltid=AfmBOooKQHP0mj-7rUatL5K4Nx7V2hiNTHEVg7JkDVJk1zcqPLNklvsY

@thetrizzard @kfoyauextlh

Re: The Outside in Nick Land’s Fanged Noumena: Exteriority, Fatalism, and the Collapse of Difference

Posted: Sat Nov 15, 2025 11:14 am
by kFoyauextlH
Wow, this came up in a weird and totally unrelated way:

https://lovecraft.fandom.com/wiki/The_F ... om_Outside

Posted: Sat Nov 15, 2025 4:22 pm
by atreestump
Crazy

Re: The Outside in Nick Land’s Fanged Noumena: Exteriority, Fatalism, and the Collapse of Difference

Posted: Thu Dec 11, 2025 12:41 am
by kFoyauextlH
You may be more familiar with language to describe what I'm about to, and which I hope you may be able to produce something regarding, but YouTube is unbearable, and part of it is this endless "teaching" that the people on there so frequently do, they are constantly seemingly starting from scratch and educating the audience on matters, and it is maddening. For all that teaching, they barely say a darn thing, it is just constantly saying stuff that is usually well known, very basic, and they are just filling space with these long descriptions, like if they were spoken to like that, theywould most likely become enraged, it is so draining.

There was a news article about the education here now being so poor that many people are way behind in their reading abilities, math, comprehension, and I believe that things like ethics and moral standards and decency goes downhill with the inability to process information in order to understand what is better or worse, right and wrong, and why.

YouTube people are constantly lecturing and going over facts from wiki pages endlessly, even insisting about what is right and wrong, but with no apparent focus on justifying why they have these views or standards, probably because they don't, they are churning out content for money and killing minds in the process, especially young people who they are receiving and really most often targeting.

In the comments, which I can no longer see because of the current issues withthe devices I have available briefly, they also used to focus on saying things to get likes but not at all caring about anything, talking to no one, showcasing people who are not really thoughtful or interesting who have nothing much to say and no reason to say anything, but going ahead anyway, which is also pretty nauseating to read.

This has in the last 20 years become one of, if not the most prevalent form of mass media and social interaction and reference to a marketplace of ideas and ways of communicating or new norms, and this is what people are absorbing constantly all day, I see them on the train and everywhere constantly using their data on TikTok, Instagram Stories, Facebook, and YouTube, otherwise games, and games may even be better than that other stuff which may include more "influence" upon their thinking and behavior and even depeiving them of more of their sense of realityand faculties than they realize.

YouTube people seem so darn stupid and illiterate, while being constantly pretentious pseudo-intellectual snotbags with elitist attitudes and rule obsessed nerdiness up the wazoo, they have horrible ineloquent voices and speech patterns, everything is so annoying about it, but it is quicker to make and find and start viewing in some cases, and requiring less research and investment, and less risk seemingly than starting a movie or finding something on the television (which I don't have and now many people probably don't also).

The main thing that I wanted to bring up though was the way they describe and re-describe, and constantly describe the world related to their topic, almost consistently between lots of different content creators, and the teaching style that is so prevalent and also just so tedious and painful, but the aspect of it of any interest to me is how so many of those people fo it, how they seem to be the majority, how it doesn't allow for ease in finding difference or variety, why it seems to them that it works, how that style came to be, I think it came from colleges, from people imagining colleges while not having been to them, and documentaries in the 2000s, streaming documentaries, then imitations of those in long form YouTube videos, and people feeling the need to make their video comprehensive, the one with it all, and also eating up time like how a person might try to fill up an essay. Even A.I. seemingly does it, and it is no wonder based on what it trains on but also what many of these people now use to write their vacuous non-content.

The world it describes and re-describes ad-nauseum is nothing like life or reality, but w completely different reality that is influenced by the way it is approachedand talked about by these annoying money hungry desperate nerds. Even their hellish voices may impact the image of the reality they conjure up that really has no existence at all, it is a meta reality that is on the internet only, as seen through the internet, which may be why people end up saying things like "touch grass".

The lack of information and feelings with any sense behind them, just noise like how they are obnoxiously loud but without using volume changes as any kind of extra communication or misusing, overusing, and abusing it until it stops making any sense or is inconsistent and has no rules and is just ever present, and other strange and pointless seeming uses or really misuses of tone, like an emdlessly snarky or sarcastic tone, an outright fake or put on voice, gosh, the things they do bother me so much and are totally damging to human communication,and this is how so many non-native speakers of various languages, like Emglish language learners, are now learning languages not otherwise spoken around them, and even the other language speakers are following the same trends in the ways that they create their content in other languages too, it is extremely devestating and will rapidly change how the next generations are likely to start communicating if they aren't socialized in other ways too, and these act like competing technologies or ways of transferring a skill, and this internet social media version is now major competitor for so many people finding it the easiest and most convenient way to frequently receive some stimulation.

The weird world that it invents through endless phrasing and contextualizing and educating, re-educating, and telling the whole story from the start every time, may even start to be projected and manifested as these people who were raised to think it was real end up fulfilling their roles as it invented them for them and they took them on.

The other, closely related thing, is American Politics and Internet Identity Hierarchies, Caste, Manipulations, all this gameplaying that goes on about who one is based on what they think and say online and how they would like to identify, based also on what they like, consume, collect, and show, almost like a weird heraldry and totemism through affiliations with things that have taken on symbolic associations, and these are often political or entertainment based. Even hairstyles amd coloring have taken on implications, and it all seems pretty cartoonish, but such things may have existed throughout the past and manifested surprisingly similarly in those cases also, but the avenues of transmission now differ and have changed the logistics of how people end up becoming what they do and how they become convinced of where they are based on imaginary schemes insisted upon online.

A worldview based on constantly repeating re-tellings of the whole story from the start, while lacking any real feeling or even information, having big gaps and blindspots while also looking for anything to criticize or ridicule, creates a terribly twisted and distorted reality that people may be carrying and imposing upon their own life experience.

Re: The Outside in Nick Land’s Fanged Noumena: Exteriority, Fatalism, and the Collapse of Difference

Posted: Thu Jan 08, 2026 12:33 pm
by kFoyauextlH
https://www.vashtimedia.com/oppenheimer ... ecropower/

Added in 1 minute 20 seconds:
That article mentions "necropower".

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necropolitics

"
Necropolitics is a sociopolitical theory of the use of social and political power to dictate how some people may live and how some must die. The deployment of necropolitics creates what Achille Mbembe calls deathworlds, or "new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to living conditions that confer upon them the status of the living dead."[1] Mbembe, author of On the Postcolony, was the first scholar to explore the term in depth in his 2003 article,[2] and later, his 2019 book of the same name.[1] Mbembe identifies racism as a prime driver of necropolitics, stating that racialized people's lives are systemically cheapened and habituated to loss.[1]
"

Added in 2 minutes 59 seconds:


"

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Achille Mbembe - What is the actual specificity of "Necropower" or "Necropolitics" ? : r/CriticalTheory




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5y ago
echoclerk
Achille Mbembe - What is the actual specificity of "Necropower" or "Necropolitics" ?

So, reading Mbembe's Necropolitics (Duke 2019) which is it interesting to note, was originally published in French as Politiques de l’inimitié in 2016 (ie the Politics of Enmity).

But my problem is really grasping what the hell does he even mean by "Necropolitics", what is specific about it. He is so vague about the concept and keeps blurring it together with other ideas.

on p. 80 for instance, he says that "the specific structure of terror that I have called necropower" has "three major characteristics".

He gives one: "the dynamics of territorial fragmentation" but then goes off on a tangent and never really clearly identifies the other two. It seems like that might include two of this set:

- Weizman's Vertical Sovereignty (but this seems to be just a 3D-ization of "territory")

- Infrastructural destruction (bulldozing) (p. 81)

- "tactics of medieval siege warfare" (p. 82)

But before he explicitly clarifies anything, he shifts back to an earlier claim that these examples in fact demonstrate the "concatenation of multiple powers: disciplinary, biopolitical and necro-political" (p. 82)

Then he just moves on the War Machines, starting a new section... leaving it to the reader to somehow work out what was supposed to have been the specificity of necropower?
Archived post. New comments cannot be posted and votes cannot be cast.
69
Comments Section
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago
• Edited 5y ago

Defense of Mbembe's concept from Christopher Breu:

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/773873/summary#info_wrap

Building off the insights of both Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben and paralleling the contemporaneous arguments of Roberto Esposito in Bíos, Mbembe's essay advanced two intertwined and crucial insights (even as he shares with Agamben and Esposito a creative, and generative, misreading of Foucault). The first insight is that Foucault's account of biopower and biopolitics as fundamentally positive (as forms of power organized around producing and intensifying rather than negating or constraining), while representing a crucial theoretical advance, is incomplete without a coinciding theory of negative power. Foucault's account of positive power works only for global spaces and contexts in which relatively soft and subtle forms of power prevail. As Foucault himself notes, it is only when life itself in the aggregate comes under the management of political and economic power that something like a positive biopolitics can be theorized. What Mbembe adds to this framework is the argument that such forms of positive power are necessarily predicated on other more resolutely negative and explicitly violent forms of power. In this his work parallels the arguments advanced by both Agamben and Esposito, but in a context that adds force to their more Eurocentric and abstractly philosophical formulations.

Necropolitics Enfleshed

Christopher Breu

symploke University of Nebraska PressVolume 28, Numbers 1-2, 2020pp. 505-508

Another Review

Review Necropolitics by Anuja Bose

Achille Mbembe
Duke University Press, Durham, 2019, viii + 213 pp.,
ISBN: 9781478006510
Contemporary Political Theory (2020). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-020-00438-w

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/1 ... 0438-w.pdf

Bose says its not about "who can die" (Foucault) but

"the capitalist state’s inherent propensity to create conditions that make living impossible."

hence the "living dead" I guess.
20
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

Necropower: “the ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are deployed in the interest of maximally destroying persons and creating death-worlds, that is, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to living conditions that confer upon them the status of the living dead.” (p. 92)

14
vris92

5y ago

I’m on mobile now but suffice to say I think Mbembe’s analysis just inherits all the problems of Foucault’s accounting. In a dialectical framework, the relations of domination concretize and determine their participants and become historically specific. Ripped out of that framework and elevated to a quasi-metaphysical principle all its own, “domination” becomes abstract, making no reference to who is being dominated and how or why. In rejecting any sort of totalizing impulse, the ontological relation between different groups in the struggle for dominance is one of total incommensurability (they can only struggle for dominance because they’re illegible and incompatible realities.) Mbembe draws on plenty of concrete examples which is great, but the whole thing feels like an abstract exercise because it’s fundamentally committed to an ontology which sees society as already constitutively fractured by difference such that it couldn’t ever be mediated to begin with, leaving one to wonder what the apparently “further” fracturing could even concretely mean. If society is already endless striving toward unattainable ontological unity, what is really being added except a more brutal account of the violence involved?
16
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

I don't really understand what you mean. Are you saying that domination can only be theorised within a Hegelian-Marxist dialectical framework?

Why? Why must it be dialectical?
2
vris92

5y ago

Well, my opinion is that the lack of specificity you’re claiming to read in Mbembe stems from the lack of a dialectical framework. I’ve tried to spell out the philosophical reasoning for this position. I think you can theorize domination in the non-Marxist framework, but you will consequently and necessarily end up with the shortcomings re:specificity you’ve identified. Postmodernists are okay with that. Revolutionaries aren’t. The choice is yours.
5
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

what is really being added except a more brutal account of the violence involved?

I think this is kind of what I don't get about the text. What is it really claiming? What is at stake?
2
vris92

5y ago

I did a reading group with some non-Marxist grad students on this text and I kept asking this exact question and they kept looking at me like I was speaking another language. It was a very strange disconnect.
2
vris92

5y ago

I’m on mobile now but suffice to say I think Mbembe’s analysis just inherits all the problems of Foucault’s accounting. In a dialectical framework, the relations of domination concretize and determine their participants and become historically specific. Ripped out of that framework and elevated to a quasi-metaphysical principle all its own, “domination” becomes abstract, making no reference to who is being dominated and how or why. In rejecting any sort of totalizing impulse, the ontological relation between different groups in the struggle for dominance is one of total incommensurability (they can only struggle for dominance because they’re illegible and incompatible realities.) Mbembe draws on plenty of concrete examples which is great, but the whole thing feels like an abstract exercise because it’s fundamentally committed to an ontology which sees society as already constitutively fractured by difference such that it couldn’t ever be mediated to begin with, leaving one to wonder what the apparently “further” fracturing could even concretely mean. If society is already endless striving toward unattainable ontological unity, what is really being added except a more brutal account of the violence involved?
16
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

I don't really understand what you mean. Are you saying that domination can only be theorised within a Hegelian-Marxist dialectical framework?

Why? Why must it be dialectical?
2
vris92

5y ago

Well, my opinion is that the lack of specificity you’re claiming to read in Mbembe stems from the lack of a dialectical framework. I’ve tried to spell out the philosophical reasoning for this position. I think you can theorize domination in the non-Marxist framework, but you will consequently and necessarily end up with the shortcomings re:specificity you’ve identified. Postmodernists are okay with that. Revolutionaries aren’t. The choice is yours.
5
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

what is really being added except a more brutal account of the violence involved?

I think this is kind of what I don't get about the text. What is it really claiming? What is at stake?
2
vris92

5y ago

I did a reading group with some non-Marxist grad students on this text and I kept asking this exact question and they kept looking at me like I was speaking another language. It was a very strange disconnect.
2
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

I don't really understand what you mean. Are you saying that domination can only be theorised within a Hegelian-Marxist dialectical framework?

Why? Why must it be dialectical?
2
vris92

5y ago

Well, my opinion is that the lack of specificity you’re claiming to read in Mbembe stems from the lack of a dialectical framework. I’ve tried to spell out the philosophical reasoning for this position. I think you can theorize domination in the non-Marxist framework, but you will consequently and necessarily end up with the shortcomings re:specificity you’ve identified. Postmodernists are okay with that. Revolutionaries aren’t. The choice is yours.
5
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

what is really being added except a more brutal account of the violence involved?

I think this is kind of what I don't get about the text. What is it really claiming? What is at stake?
2
vris92

5y ago

I did a reading group with some non-Marxist grad students on this text and I kept asking this exact question and they kept looking at me like I was speaking another language. It was a very strange disconnect.
2
vris92

5y ago

I’m on mobile now but suffice to say I think Mbembe’s analysis just inherits all the problems of Foucault’s accounting. In a dialectical framework, the relations of domination concretize and determine their participants and become historically specific. Ripped out of that framework and elevated to a quasi-metaphysical principle all its own, “domination” becomes abstract, making no reference to who is being dominated and how or why. In rejecting any sort of totalizing impulse, the ontological relation between different groups in the struggle for dominance is one of total incommensurability (they can only struggle for dominance because they’re illegible and incompatible realities.) Mbembe draws on plenty of concrete examples which is great, but the whole thing feels like an abstract exercise because it’s fundamentally committed to an ontology which sees society as already constitutively fractured by difference such that it couldn’t ever be mediated to begin with, leaving one to wonder what the apparently “further” fracturing could even concretely mean. If society is already endless striving toward unattainable ontological unity, what is really being added except a more brutal account of the violence involved?
16
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

I don't really understand what you mean. Are you saying that domination can only be theorised within a Hegelian-Marxist dialectical framework?

Why? Why must it be dialectical?
2
vris92

5y ago

Well, my opinion is that the lack of specificity you’re claiming to read in Mbembe stems from the lack of a dialectical framework. I’ve tried to spell out the philosophical reasoning for this position. I think you can theorize domination in the non-Marxist framework, but you will consequently and necessarily end up with the shortcomings re:specificity you’ve identified. Postmodernists are okay with that. Revolutionaries aren’t. The choice is yours.
5
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

what is really being added except a more brutal account of the violence involved?

I think this is kind of what I don't get about the text. What is it really claiming? What is at stake?
2
vris92

5y ago

I did a reading group with some non-Marxist grad students on this text and I kept asking this exact question and they kept looking at me like I was speaking another language. It was a very strange disconnect.
2
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

(p. 92) "I have demonstrated that the notion of biopower is insufficient to account for contemporary forms of the subjugation of life to the power of death"

Mbembe ends chapter 3 with this claim, which really seems quite bold, given how little time he spent actually discussing Foucault.

In the opening paragraph he basically seems to misread biopolitcs anyway, treating it as a form of "sovereignty". Obviously there is some debate on what exactly Foucault means by these terms and the relations between disciplinary power and biopower, but there is something too simplistic in the early presentation given by Mbembe.
13
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

Previous thread which seems to express a similar difficulty in grasping what is significantly "necro"


4
u/plaidbyron avatar
plaidbyron

5y ago
• Edited 5y ago

When Axelle Karera was the keynote speaker at a conference on necropolitics at my department, she responded favorably to a paper somebody else gave on Mbembe and Bataille. Karera even said something to the effect of "If there is to be a future of the concept of necropolitics, it probably won't lie in the direction of Foucault and biopolitics, which is played out, but in the direction of Bataille."

I seem to recall that Mbembe actually talks about Bataille at least as much as (or even more than) Foucault in the Necropolitics essay. So I'm not an expert on this and I am just a little bit skeptical of the novelty of the concept myself (having heard a lot of people describe necropolitics to me in terms that just sound like what Foucault already said), but I'd like to pass along this piece of advice, which was the upshot of that conference for me: see if Mbembe's passages drawing on Bataille help you distinguish something radically beyond biopower in his work.
3
u/plaidbyron avatar
plaidbyron

5y ago
• Edited 5y ago

When Axelle Karera was the keynote speaker at a conference on necropolitics at my department, she responded favorably to a paper somebody else gave on Mbembe and Bataille. Karera even said something to the effect of "If there is to be a future of the concept of necropolitics, it probably won't lie in the direction of Foucault and biopolitics, which is played out, but in the direction of Bataille."

I seem to recall that Mbembe actually talks about Bataille at least as much as (or even more than) Foucault in the Necropolitics essay. So I'm not an expert on this and I am just a little bit skeptical of the novelty of the concept myself (having heard a lot of people describe necropolitics to me in terms that just sound like what Foucault already said), but I'd like to pass along this piece of advice, which was the upshot of that conference for me: see if Mbembe's passages drawing on Bataille help you distinguish something radically beyond biopower in his work.
3
u/bobthebobbest avatar
bobthebobbest

5y ago

It may be helpful to read the essay “Necropolitics” (2003) where he initially sets out the concept, along with its differences from biopolitics. Available here.

I’ve been told the French version of the essay is better, but I can’t read French.
2
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

I think that Chapter 3 of the book: Necropolitics (Duke 2019) /Politiques de l’inimitié (2016), which is titled "Necropolitics" is the same text as the 2003 essay. I had read the essay before the book, and much of the content is the same.

I think there may be slight differences but I haven't compared the two in detail.
2
u/echoclerk avatar
echoclerk
OP •
5y ago

What is really the "Problem" that Mbembe is trying to solve or elaborate? I think this remains quite unclear in the book and essay.

I would say his essential claims are something like:

1- that Foucault's various accounts of power don't fit the Colony/Post-Colony (This would then build on Mbembe's work in On The PostColony which argues similarly that the usual theoretical political-forms do not fit operation of the state in the post-colony).

2- Moreover, Foucault basically ignores the Colony and Post-Colony.

3 - This matters because the intra-"west"/Euro political-forms (models of state and power-structures such as biopolitics etc) are actually dependent on or intractably intertwined with the state-form of the colony/post-colony.

- But then does Mbembe really prove this? How would you prove that the present form of intra "west" politics could NOT have arisen without the violence of the colony and slavery? Is this why you need a dialectical sense of progressive history? ie does Mbembe need a sense of historical necessity to argue that the colony/postcolony was the condition of possibility of the "West"

4 - In the end, Mbembe's alternative thus aims to offer a more complete account of current political forms. ie the stakes are then basically: Who has the best theoretical account of the operation of present international-political-system.

So really its about offering a better theory of present political situation?
2
[deleted]

5y ago

u/echoclerk avatar


[deleted]

5y ago

u/echoclerk avatar


u/Status_Ad8334 avatar
Status_Ad8334

3y ago

Its his mo of writing,if you think you've seen anything check out 'On the post colony' by him.
1
u/PlinyToTrajan avatar
PlinyToTrajan

1y ago

What Mbembe theorized has been given its most compelling expression in real life, in an intentionally demonstrative way, in the Gaza strip.
"

Added in 3 minutes 17 seconds:
https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabul ... opolitics/

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/a ... 8625000039

"
Emerging emotions in the face of the necropower of organized crime: Between domination and agency
"

So, this might be something to clarify and discuss potentially.

Added in 1 minute 29 seconds:
https://socialscienceresearch.org/index ... TS_NLM_xml

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Precariat

"
In sociology and economics, the precariat (/prɪˈkɛəriət/) is a social class formed by people suffering from precarity, which means existing without predictability or security, affecting material or psychological welfare. The term is a portmanteau merging precarious with proletariat.[1]

Unlike the proletariat class of industrial workers in the 20th century who lacked their own means of production and hence sold their labor to live, members of the precariat are only partially involved in labor and must undertake extensive unremunerated activities that are essential if they are to retain access to jobs and to decent earnings. Classic examples of such unpaid activities include continually having to search for work (including preparing for and attending job interviews), as well as being expected to be perpetually responsive to calls for "gig" work (yet without being paid an actual wage for being "on call").

The hallmark of the precariat class is the condition of lack of job security, including intermittent employment or underemployment and the resultant precarious existence.[2] The emergence of this class has been ascribed to the entrenchment of neoliberal capitalism.[3][4]
"

Added in 45 seconds:
https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7453180/

Added in 2 minutes 36 seconds:
"
The adequacy of any theory of radical democracy requires that it thematize the social conditions within which an emancipatory politics might be enacted. Paul Apostolidis’s The Fight for Time offers a sustained reflection on how democratic politics is both frustrated and facilitated by widespread and increasing precarity. However, as this Critical Exchange demonstrates, the nature of precarity, the forms that political agency and solidarity might take in response to it, and the appropriate site within which precarious social conditions can be contested and transformed, is controversial. Precarity refers to a situation lacking in predictability, security or material and social welfare. Importantly, this condition is socially produced by the development of post-Fordist capitalism (which relies on flexible employment practices) and neoliberal forms of governance (which remove social protections) (see Azmanova, 2020). Precarity entails social suffering, which is manifested in the declining mental and physical health of both working and ‘out of work’ people and compounded by the attribution of personal responsibility to individuals for their politically induced predicament (Apostolidis, 2019, pp. 3–5). Precarity leads to social isolation as workers find themselves segregated and alienated by work processes while the capacity to sustain community is undermined (pp. 8–10). Moreover, precarity leads to temporal displacement with precarious workers finding they have no time to do much else than work: they must constantly make time to find and prepare for work and, in doing so, become out of sync with the normal rhythms of social life (pp. 5–8). Precarity involves social dislocation as people are forced to relocate to adapt to precarious situations at the same time as their movements are constrained and policed (pp. 10–12). Importantly, precarity is distributed unequally, with people of colour, women, low-status workers and many in the global south experiencing its most devastating effects. At the same time, however, some of its aspects penetrate all social strata. As Apostolidis (2019, p. 2) puts it, ‘if precarity names the special plight of the world’s most virulently oppressed human beings, it also denotes a near-universal complex of unfreedom’.

Recognizing that anti-capitalist struggle has always been a fight for time, Apostolidis (2019, p. 15) reflects on how this fight should be adapted to our present political conjuncture. To develop this vision of radical democratic politics, he turns to the experience of migrant day labourers to both diagnose contemporary social pathologies and envision alternative social possibilities. The research for the book is based on Apostolidis’s involvement in the activities of two worker centres located in Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon. In addition to participating in various activities of the centres (such as staffing phones and running occupational health and safety sessions), the research team conducted 78 interviews with migrant day labourers. Through interpreting the interviews, Apostolidis practices a kind of political theory inspired by Paulo Freire, which he characterises as ‘critical-popular analysis’ (p. 30). By attending to the self-interpretations of the research participants, Apostolidis characterises precarity and considers the possibility of its transformation in terms of four generative themes around which the book is structured. The first three themes speak to the experience of precarity: ‘desperate responsibility’, ‘fighting for the job’ and ‘risk on all sides, eyes wide open’. The fourth theme envisions an anti-precarity politics in terms of a ‘convivial politics’.

As Apostolidis acknowledges, there is an ethnographic dimension to this project since it provides a thick description of the everyday experiences and practices of migrant day labourers. However, it also entails critical-popular analysis since Apostolidis aims to co-create political theory with the research participants. He does so by staging a constructive dialogue between the self-interpretations and practical insights of day labourers and the systematic and defamiliarized perspective afforded by critical theory. The Fight for Time not only provides insight into how some of the most vulnerable people in society experience, negotiate and resist precarity: from this social perspective, it aims to generate a wider understanding, of what agency all working (and ‘out of work’) people have to challenge the precaritisation of social life.

As such, the book pivots on a fundamental distinction between day labour as exception and day labour as synecdoche. As Kathi Weeks explains below, this paradigmatic understanding of the precarity of day labouring, enables a perspectival shift from the singular experiences and ideas of migrant day labourers to the more general social condition of precarity and the possibility of its transformation. On the one hand, Apostolidis considers those exceptionalising forms of precarity that dominate day labourers’ lives, differentiating them from other members of society. On the other hand, however, Apostolidis considers the significance of day labour as synecdoche for how precarity permeates social relations on a much broader social scale. A synecdoche is a figure of speech in which a part represents the whole. An often remarked on synecdoche in political language is that of the people, whereby the poor (those who do not participate in politics) speak in the name of the citizenry (the people as a whole). Similarly, Apostolidis treats day labour as synecdoche, according to which the exceptional forms of precarity experienced by labourers might make visible the precarity that increasingly conditions all social relations.

In the final chapters, Apostolidis explores how worker centres might also function synecdochally insofar as the purpose of association is construed not only instrumentally, as protection against the risks associated with precarity, but in terms of their constitutive potential to sustain convivial networks of political possibility for more mutually supportive, creative and pluralistic forms of solidarity than those afforded by traditional unionised spaces. It is in these spaces, which are both mundane and potentially extraordinary, that Apostolidis discerns a nascent form of radical democratic politics that consists in a struggle against precarity. This entails three key elements: first, the refusal of work, i.e. the refusal to allow one’s life to be consumed according to one’s role as worker within capitalist social relations; second, the constitution of spaces for egalitarian social interaction that resist the imperatives of neoliberal governance, and; third, the reclamation of people’s time from capitalist and state powers (p. 34). This recuperation of time (the time robbed from people’s lives, which is symptomatic of alienated labour) is fundamental to understanding how day labour might function as synecdoche both of the wider social condition of precarity and the possibility of its transformation. As Apostolidis explains, ‘working people are running out of time and living out of time’ (p. 8; emphasis in original). In this context, he suggests, day labourers’ socialized activities within the ‘time-gaps’ of the precarious work economy indicate how the ‘time of everyday precarity’ might be remade into ‘novel, unpredictable, and politically generative temporalities’ (p. 29).

The contributors to this Critical Exchange engage with two key aspects of the politics of precarity. The first relates to the subject of an anti-precarity politics and the extent to which the exceptional but inevitably partial experiences of day labourers can function as a synecdoche for the precarity of all. Edwina Barvosa questions whether identification with precarity provides an adequate basis for an emancipatory politics, given that it may condition unreflexive modes of action. Bice Maiguashca suggests that an intersectional politics would require attending to multiple exceptions, each with their own set of experiences and aspirations, as the basis for a coalitional anti-precarity politics. Leah Bassel similarly advocates building a politics of migrant justice from the knowledge experiences that are generated by a matrix of oppression, which requires acknowledging struggles against patriarchy and racism as well as capitalist domination. In this context, she emphasises the political imperative of making settler colonialism visible in any analysis of migrant justice, including acknowledging the social position of migrants as settlers. In contrast, Kathi Weeks highlights how certain appropriations of the Marxian category of Lumpenproletariat resonate with Apostolidis’s synecdochal interpretation of day labour. As such, it can be interpreted as a conceptual articulation of a heterogenous – rather than a homogenizing – political subject. Indeed, in his response, Apostolidis clarifies that the use of the term synecdoche indicates that the perspectival shift from the experience of day labour to the general social condition of precarity is intended as a contingent act of representation – rather than a reductive empirical truth.

The second issue relates to the mode and site of political organizing against precarity, encapsulated in Apostolidis’s demand of ‘workers’ centres for all’. Weeks emphasises the urgency of politicizing workplace death and injury, which is obscured by the managerial appropriation of discourses of health and well-being with increased productivity of workers. Yet, she is concerned that workers centres might be susceptible to co-optation. Moreover, she wonders whether workers centres require embodied social interaction to be effective or might also be realised in virtual spaces. Bassel highlights how such anti-precarity spaces are both sustained by affective labour of women and may reproduce other forms of oppression. Maiguashca wonders what the visionary pragmatism that Apostolidis ascribes to day laborers has in common with the principled pragmatism that she and Catherine Eschle observed among feminist activists involved in the Global Justice Movement. Barvosa questions the assumption that global inequality is most effectively redressed through the mobilization of oppressed groups according to a salt-of-the-earth script. She invokes instead to an alternative keep-only-a-competency script, according to which social inequality might be more effectively reduced by the voluntary giving of the wealthy. In response, Apostolidis elaborates on the benefits of the critical-popular approach he adopts in the book. While the practical focus of The Fight for Time supports a coalitional politics as a key mode of struggle, Apostolidis highlights the limits of a ‘coalitional epistemology’, which would require a cumulative assemblage of particularised knowledges prior to envisioning a desirable form of mass solidarity.

Lois McNay (2014) has rightly highlighted how radical democratic theory risks becoming ‘socially weightless’ to the extent that it treats the social world as contingent, devoid of any significance of its own and able to be reshaped in limitless ways through political action. Radical democrats tend to over-estimate the agency of members of oppressed groups when they neglect the mundane experiences of social suffering, which undermine individuals’ capacity to participate in politics (McNay, 2014, pp. 11, 14–15). As this Critical Exchange demonstrates, The Fight For Time challenges theorists of radical democracy to recognise the weight of the world while reflecting on how political agency is shaped, constrained and enabled by the conditions that it seeks to transform. Moreover it challenges us to reflect on how political solidarity is possible across the differences and inequalities that are currrently being exacerbated and intensified by the social production of precarity in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
"

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https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politics ... /7697/3713

An article about the "young precariat" population.

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https://www.tni.org/files/publication-d ... apter7.pdf

Another similar file, more general perhaps.

Re: The Outside in Nick Land’s Fanged Noumena: Exteriority, Fatalism, and the Collapse of Difference

Posted: Tue Jan 20, 2026 8:00 am
by kFoyauextlH
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/wp-con ... 1200px.jpg

Chopped up so that Africa is missing, even though people wrongfully think of it as one place, like they think of the U.S.A. which gets to be one place while Africa, among others, doesn't.

Added in 3 days 2 hours 36 minutes 10 seconds: